This article analyses shoot-out clauses as a popular means of resolving deadlocks in two member partnerships or close corporations. It presents the different varieties of shoot-out clauses developed in Anglo-American legal practice that are being increasingly discussed on the European continent. It goes on to look at their advantages and disadvantages by exploring the rich economic literature on partnership dissolution mechanisms in game theory. Finally, it focuses on the permissibility of these clauses and the doubts cast upon them in Germany, Austria, England and the United States.
beginning to be discussed with increasing frequency in German literature 5 (and elsewhere  6 ) and their inclusion is recommended in sample legal forms published to assist in company foundation.
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This article will first present the different varieties of "shoot-out" clauses that can be found in legal practice (II). It will also present their advantages and disadvantages including an analysis of the economic literature covering dissolution mechanisms available to partnerships and close corporations 8 (III). The final section will focus on the permissibility of and the doubts cast upon these clauses in partnership and corporation law. 9 Case law on the matter is not yet available in Germany, although it can be found in Austria 10 and the United States 
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II.
Shoot-out Clauses in Legal Practice
Shoot-Out Procedures -The Term and its Significance
Shoot-out procedures provide for a smooth and swift end to a partnership by transferring all shares to one shareholder. 12 Although clauses that provide for this procedure are often used in joint venture contracts 13 , they are also useful for venture capital contracts 14 and for smaller partnerships. In practice, they are most popular for 50:50 partnerships and close corporations held by two people. 15 Where more than two partners are involved, shoot-out procedures may still be effective where these partners can be separated into two groups, each with a homogeneous structure. 16 Where this is not the case, the mechanics of the procedure become significantly more complicated. 17 
Forms of Shoot-Out Procedures
Shoot-out clauses exist in different forms, although they are all based on the same uniform structure with the first part defining a trigger or deadlock event 18 , and the second detailing the process to be followed once the procedure is triggered. Often these triggers are associated with a deadlock regarding specifically listed matters for resolution (i.e. major decisions). 19 To prevent the shoot-out procedure being carried out too hastily or without due consideration, legal practitioners recommend including a negotiation 20 or cooling-off period 21 after the initial 5 agree to submit sealed bids to an independent third party, with the right to purchase going to either the highest sealed bid or the fairest sealed bid (the price closest to the price determined by the appointed third party as being the fair value of the shares). The deterrent approach, not yet well known in Germany, involves setting a procedure in the articles of association that will determine a fair value per share, after notice has been served initiating a shoot out. Based on this price, Party B can then either purchase A's shares at a pre-agreed discount (e.g. 20%) or sell the shares for the same pre-agreed premium. This approach serves to encourage parties to seek mutually acceptable solutions, and deter them from instigating the procedure too lightly.
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III.
Economic Analysis
Advantages and Disadvantages
One oft cited advantage of the shoot-out procedure is that it ensures a high degree of fairness with regard to price; the parties have an incentive to name the fairest offer price possible, due to the danger of themselves having to sell (or buy) at a disproportionately low (high) price. 
Shoot-Out Clauses in Partnerships and Close Corporations -An Approach from Comparative Law and Economic Theory -
Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 11/13
6 Appeals in a very similar vein: "The possibility that the person naming the price can be forced either to buy or sell keeps the first mover honest". 35 Other voices compare the partition and selection process to the well-known cake-cutting rule: "I cut, you choose". 36 Still others regard shoot out clauses as a Solomonic solution. 37 The deterrent approach, which uses an independent third party following a pre-agreed process, can also be expected to ensure a fair price. Additionally, the automatic process contained in a shoot-out procedure allows for a quick and clean exit from the company, even where negotiations between the parties have been abandoned 38 . Moreover, the finality threatened by a shoot-out increases pressure on the parties to find an amicable settlement 39 .
The first disadvantage of the shoot-out procedure arises from the lack of a predictable outcome. This may lead to undesired results where a partner who has made a conscious decision to leave the company is instead forced to become the sole owner of the company as a result of the shoot-out procedure. 40 Problems also arise where one shareholder possesses the business know-how or necessary goodwill for the operation of the company. The absence of this knowledge or connections may have dire consequences for the remaining shareholder 41 .
Also not to be ruled out is the potential abuse of the shoot-out procedure by the financially stronger party to force the other party out of the company at an unfair price: where Party A knows Party B cannot afford to make a counter offer and will be forced to sell, the intended disciplinary effect of the procedure is lost. 42 to, they were in fact rarely employed 60 ; and more recently, by the revelation that auctions were not as prevalent as buy-sell clauses, much to the bafflement of economists 61 . 
IV. Validity of Shoot-out Clauses in
c) US case law and doctrine
In the United States, courts treat shoot-out clauses as presumptively fair. 71 The 
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12 price that was 250% higher than the purchase price of the co-member's membership interest.
The court held that the member-manager violated his fiduciary duty, adding that the seller cannot waive or disclaim its right to those fiduciary protections in connection with the transaction because, to be valid, the seller must have made an informed decision to grant the waiver. 76 
Potential for abuse
Contrary to premature conclusions drawn by some authors, the shoot-out procedure cannot guarantee that all interests are equally met in any given case. There are some typical fact patterns where the "checks-and-balances"-argument does not hold. Most importantly, the ploy of switching the purchasing role to ensure fairness falls flat where Party B is not in a financial position to purchase Party A's shares. 77 Although this "access to cash" problem 78 may be ameliorated by obtaining financial assistance from external sources 79 , it cannot be completely eliminated. Where Party A is aware of Party B's limited financial resource, the temptation to "low-ball" exists. 80 Drawing on the language adopted in anti-trust law for this strategy, relevant literature makes reference to the "predatory potential of Texan Shootouts" 81 .
a) US case law
This exploitation of financial weakness for one's own benefit has woken the protective instincts of the courts. In the US, different findings as to its permissibility have been handed 14 factual assumption that Party A knew about his co-partners' financial distress and sought to exploit it to his own advantage. 89 Moreover, Party B also deserves judicial protection when the financially stronger Party A deliberately engineers a trigger event, e.g. a deadlock situation, to force Party B out of the partnership at an economically convenient time, possibly also on unfair terms. In that case, the courts might deem a trigger event not to have happened if it was brought about in breach of good faith. In terms of contract interpretation, a recent English decision on buy-sell clauses is already leading the way in this approach. 90 The German Federal Court of Justice came to a similar conclusion in a slightly different context; a partner cannot rely on a mutually agreed continuation clause to defend actions carried out in bad faith.
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V. Contractual Design and Safeguards
As seen, shoot-out clauses can lead to disadvantages for the financially weaker partner. To limit the potential for abuse, legal practice provides a range of different potential solutions, which promise varying levels of success. A contract clause that requires both partners to do what they can to prevent deadlocks 92 is redundant in Germany, as this obligation already exists as a result of the fiduciary duties between partners. A clause requiring that any offers made as part of a shoot-out procedure must equate to a "good faith estimation" 93 of the market value is theoretically attractive, but difficult to implement in practice. Providing the financially weaker party with a fixed time frame, usually between 30-60 days, to arrange the necessary financing, or allowing purchase on deferred terms may prove to be a more practical solution. 94 As an alternative or additional measure, the right to seek a third party to purchase the interests in the company may be provided. 95 Agreement to a blackout period is also conceivable, to prevent the termination procedure from being initiated until after the project has been stabilised. 96 Even with contractual safeguards, the use of shoot-outs, particularly in the presence of a large financial disparity between the partners; must be approached with caution. 97 While they are by no means perfect 98 , they are worth considering in the formation of a partnership. Their value does not appear in the implementation of the procedure, but rather before it; rationally dealing partners, faced with the uncertainty and finality of a shoot-out procedure may in fact be more inclined to retake their seats at the negotiating table.
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V. Summary
3. In principle, shoot-out clauses are valid. US courts treat them as presumptively fair. Under
German law, they do neither directly nor indirectly limit the inalienable exit rights in partnership law ( § 723 BGB), nor do they usually violate the public policy provision ( § 138 BGB). In exceptional cases, however, they may be deemed to be against public policy, if at the outset one of the two partners is not in a position to finance the purchase of the remaining shares, as this might result in the weaker partner adopting 'avoid at all costs' behaviour as far as the shoot-out procedure and its potential disadvantages are concerned ("Damocles Sword"-argument).
4. The shoot-out procedure, despite its inherent fairness, cannot guarantee that all interests are equally met in any given case. Its predatory potential becomes obvious when one party knows that the other party is unable to pay the purchase price and exploits his financial weakness by a "low ball"-offer. US courts are split on whether such behaviour violates the fiduciary duty of co-partners. In Germany, such a predatory offer may run afoul of the duty of good faith and fair dealing ( § 242 BGB) and the fiduciary duty in partnerships and close corporations.
5. The potential for abuse of a shoot-out procedure to the disadvantage of the financially weaker party can be mitigated by including appropriate safeguards in the partnership agreement. Nevertheless, where a large disparity between the partners exists, shoot-out clauses should be applied with caution.
6. Finally, practical experience from England and the United States has shown that although shoot-out clauses are often included in partnership agreements, they are only rarely executed, meaning that their value lies more in their deterrent effect with regard to termination.
